Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining by Andaluz, Joaquín et al.
IZA DP No. 3757




























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
October 2008 





University of Zaragoza  
 
Miriam Marcén 
University of Zaragoza 
 
José Alberto Molina 











P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 











Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining 
 
This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-
term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take 
decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the 
future, for the spouse who takes the second decision, increases the set of possible 
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 Introduction
This paper examines the dynamic aspects of partner relationships. Specif-
ically, we analyse the in￿ uence of the valuation of the current situation on
both the time that each individual devotes to the provision of a family good,
and the gains of well-being derived from cooperation.
The theoretical study of family decision-making, and its relationship with
consumption and labor supply, has produced a signi￿cant body of literature.
Some of these works take as reference the theory of bilateral bargaining. In
this framework, the results of the bargaining depend on the threat point
that is ￿xed, that is to say, the status quo. Family bargaining models have
mainly identi￿ed this threat point with divorce (Manser and Brown, 1980;
McElroy and Horney, 1981). In this case, it is assumed that the agents can
communicate freely and that the ful￿llment of agreements is guaranteed by
an external contract or institution. Nevertheless, divorce does not necessarily
constitute the only possible threat point in a bargaining process. Lundberg
and Pollak (1993) and Chen and Woolley (2001) consider a noncooperative
equilibrium: Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In this situation, the status quo is
de￿ned as an internal situation in the bargaining process and the agents take
their decisions simultaneously at the threat point.
These family bargaining models do not take into account the dynamic
aspects of the bargaining process. An exception is the work of Andaluz and
Molina (2007), who develop a repeated noncooperative game in which both
members of a family can contribute voluntarily to the provision of a family
public good. They study how individual preferences, the degree of altruism
between agents, and the bargaining power of spouses, in￿ uence the sustain-
ability of agreements.
In our work, we extend the analysis of the dynamic aspects of the family
bargaining process using a model of bilateral bargaining in which the status
2quo is de￿ned as a noncooperative solution. We assume that in this stage the
spouses take their decisions sequentially (equilibrium of Stackelberg). Those
situations in which one of the spouses takes a decision, knowing the decision
already taken by the other spouse, have not previously been considered in the
literature. Additionally, the analysis of family decisions, from the perspective
of the noncooperative game, allows us to capture dynamic elements of the
models of family bargaining. In this framework, Pareto-superior solutions can
arise as a result of repeated games in the absence of institutions that require
the agents to ful￿ll the agreements. In accordance with the folk theorem,
cooperation can be derived from the equilibrium of a repeated game, whenever
the players have a greater valuation of the present, and when there exists some
internal mechanism that punishes all deviation from the cooperative solution.
As regards the main results, we should mention that a greater valuation
of the present, rather than the future, implies an increase in the possible
sustainable agreements derived from the bargaining, as well as an increase in
the proportion of time devoted to the family good for the spouse who decides
second.
I Framework
We develop a supergame in an intrahousehold framework in which spouses
may contribute voluntarily to the provision of a family good whose consump-
tion is nonrival. We suppose that the agents do not know the moment of the
dissolution of the marriage, and that the objective of each is to maximize the




where ￿ denotes the discount factor, xj indicates the private consumption of
agent j; j = 1;2; Q represents the family good, Q = q1+q2; with qj being the
3proportion of hours that agent j devotes to the provision of this good. The
family good, Q, can include any situation which requires the joint performance
of the spouses. For instance, the quality of the children, the maintenance of
the home, or the result of elder care.
We suppose that both spouses have identical preferences, represented by
the following functional form (see Konrad and Lommerud 2000):
u1 = x1 + Q ￿ q
￿
1;u2 = x2 + Q ￿ q￿
2 (1)
where x1 = w1(1 ￿ q1) and x2 = w2(1 ￿ q2), wj represents the wage rate
for agent j and the maximum time available for each spouse is normalized to
one.
We assume that the contribution to the family good not only reduces
the time available to the labor market, but also has a psychological cost,







, being ￿;￿ > 1:
In what follows, we ￿rst solve the one-shot game and then determine the
optimum levels of consumption and contribution to the family good among
all the multiple stationary paths.
II The one-shot game
We formulate a noncooperative equilibrium in which the result is determined
sequentially (see Espinosa and Rhee 1989). In our work, the provision of a
family good is the outcome of a Stackelberg game in which the leader (spouse
1) commits to a certain quantity of provision, while anticipating the optimal
contribution of the follower (spouse 2). Spouse 1 chooses his own private
consumption and his provision of the family good, after knowing the provision
of the family good decided by spouse 2.
We could consider a situation where only one of the agents (spouse 2)
4has acquired the skills for providing a family good. In this situation, spouses
cannot take decisions simultaneously, since the other (spouse 1) can anticipate
the optimal contribution of spouse 2 to decide his contribution (See Buchholz
et al. 1997). Therefore, spouse 1 acts as a leader and spouse 2 acts as a
follower.
Applying the backward induction procedure, we begin by obtaining the
equilibrium corresponding to spouse 2 (the follower). Formally,
Max
x2;q2
u2 = x2 + Q ￿ q￿
2
s:to x2 = w2(1 ￿ q2)
q1 = ￿ q1
(2)

















and the utility level,
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u1 = x1 + Q ￿ q
￿
1




5and we obtain the level of private consumption and the provision of the
















Therefore, the levels of utility in the noncooperative solution for both
spouses are,
u￿























In an intrahousehold framework, spouses can tacitly achieve Pareto-superior
levels of private consumption and family good, since they are able to implic-
itly create a strategy that punishes all deviations from a cooperative solution.
Therefore, the choice of a cooperative solution among the possible equilibria
is a reasonable result in long term intrahousehold relationships. However,
the equilibrium of the one shot game can be the result in a supergame, since
the repetition of the game is not su¢ cient to eliminate the static noncoop-
erative equilibrium. To guarantee the achievement of a cooperative solution,
we introduce a punishment strategy. We adopt the so-called trigger strategy
(Friedman, 1971), so that when there is a deviation of the cooperative solu-
tion, the levels of private consumption and the provision of the family good
revert to those of noncooperative equilibrium.
For the sake of simplicity, we only consider the case of stationary paths
for all t. A stationary path is sustainable in a subgame perfect equilibrium if
it satis￿es the following conditions:
6uj(xj;Q) ￿ u￿









The condition (9) establishes that both spouses have incentives to coop-
erate, since the well-being these agents obtain in the cooperative solution is
greater or equal to the well-being obtained in the noncooperative solution.
The condition (10) determines that the spouse who decides second has not
incentive to deviate from the e¢ cient solution. Therefore, the maintenance of
the cooperative equilibrium depends on the agent who decides second. Given
the sequential nature of this game, if spouse 1 observes that spouse 2 does
not deviate, nor will he.
In Figure 1, we represent the curves of indi⁄erence of the spouses in the
noncooperative solution. For spouse 1, the slope of the curve of indi⁄erence in
the noncooperative equilibrium is zero in (q￿
1;q￿
2) and is increasing and convex
if q1 > q￿

















Analogously, for spouse 2, the slope of the curve of indi⁄erence that con-
tains the solution of the one shot game is equal to minus in￿nity in the combi-
nation (q￿
1;q￿
2), and is increasing and concave when q1 > q￿

















All the points located inside the area formed by both curves of indi⁄er-
ence are Pareto superior to the equilibrium of the one shot game. Those
located in the contract curve CC￿are e¢ cient solutions. However, as we
have mentioned above, the sustainability of an e¢ cient solution as a result of
repeated interaction is not guaranteed if no strategy of punishment is intro-
duced. To incorporate this strategy of punishment, we can de￿ne the function
g = g(q1;q2;￿); representing all the combinations of the provision of the family
7good, (q1;q2) that satisfy the restriction (10) with equality given the discount
factor. Formally,
g(q1;q2;￿) = (1 ￿ w2)q2 ￿ q￿













From (11), we deduce that the set of Pareto-superior solutions to the
equilibrium of the one shot game, sustainable by way of the repeated inter-
action, is greater when the discount factor is higher. We observe that when
q1 > q￿
1 and q2 > q￿
2, the function g is increasing and concave, with the value




As shown in Figure 1, among the Pareto-superior combinations (q1;q2),
we can identify a subset of sustainable solutions which can be achieved by way
of repeated interaction. In particular, all the combinations of (q1;q2) located
to the right of the broken line.
Figure 1. Set of Pareto-Superior Solutions.
(Figure 1 here)
III Bargaining solution
In order to determine an equilibrium among the multiple stationary paths,
it is necessary to specify how the levels of consumption and contribution
to the family good are chosen among all possible solutions. Focusing on
the study of sustainable solutions, we suppose that there exists a bargaining
process in which both spouses take their decisions by way of the symmetric
Nash bargaining solution. That is to say, they choose the stationary paths of
private consumption and family good provision that maximize the product of
8the utilities, after being normalized by the utility levels of the noncooperative
solution, and within the set of sustainable equilibria. Formally,
Max
x1;x2;q1;q2
J(x1;x2;q1;q2) = (u1 ￿ u￿
1)(u2 ￿ u￿
2)
s:to (9) and (10)
(12)
The solution of the previous problem depends on the discount factor.
In fact, when ￿ takes value zero, the noncooperative solution satis￿es the
restrictions (9) and (10). Alternatively, if this factor takes value one, all
the Pareto-superior solutions are indeed sustainable and consequently, the
bargaining agreement constitutes an e¢ cient solution. In both cases, the
bargaining solution is determined by way of the tangency between an Iso-J
line and an Iso-g line, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Set of possible sustainable bargaining solutions
(Figure 2 here)
Proposition
The contribution to the family good of the spouse who decides second (fol-
lower) is increasing with respect to the discount factor:
dq2
d￿ > 0:
The in￿uence of the discount factor on the contribution to the family good




We assume that J(x1;x2;q1;q2) is strictly concave with the slopes of the






Di⁄erentiating the ￿rst order conditions of (12) with respect to ￿, in an








￿￿￿(1 ￿ w2 ￿ ￿q￿￿1
2 ) + (q1 ￿ q￿
1)(J11
￿






From (1 ￿ w2 ￿ ￿q￿￿1
2 ) < 0 ; q1 > q￿


















which can be positive or negative,
dq1
d￿ 7 0.￿
From this result, it is possible to deduce that the agent who makes his
decisions second, will devote more time to the provision of the family good
when he places more value on the present. However, the path of the con-
tribution to the family good made by the spouse who decides ￿rst can be
increased or decreased, depending on the discount factor. An increasing evo-
lution implies that the di⁄erence between the hours that this agent devotes
to the family good in the cooperative solution, and the hours determined in
the noncooperative equilibrium, is not very signi￿cant.
Knowing the evolution of the paths of the provision of the family good, we
































For both spouses, an increase in the discount factor can increase or reduce
the level of utility in the bargaining solution. Concretely, if the bargaining
agreement implies a signi￿cant increase in the contribution to the family good
10made by the leader, a greater discount factor gives rise to a greater level
of utility for the leader, and a lower level of utility for the follower. The
opposite occurs if the di⁄erence between the time devoted to the provision
of the household good in cooperation, and in the one-shot game, is not very
signi￿cant.
IV Conclusions
This paper has focused on the dynamic aspects of bargaining processes. We
have set up a supergame in an intrahousehold framework in which both
spouses may contribute voluntarily to the provision of a family good. We
have adopted a punishment strategy, namely the trigger strategy, to guaran-
tee the achievement of a cooperative solution in a supergame. Thus, both
spouses can punish all deviations from a cooperative solution and can tacitly
achieve Pareto-superior levels of private consumption and family good. We
have assumed that in the noncooperative equilibrium, spouses decide sequen-
tially the levels of private consumption and the time devoted to the provision
of a family good. The sequential characterization of the decision making
implies that the maintenance of all possible cooperative solutions will be ex-
clusively conditional on the behavior of the spouse who decides in second (the
follower), which facilitates the identi￿cation of the set of possible sustainable
bargaining agreements.
Spouses choose the stationary paths of private consumption and family
good provision by way of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. After
introducing this process of bargaining, we are able to deduce the in￿ uence of
the valuation of the present on the time that each individual devotes to the
provision of a family good and, its e⁄ects on the gains of well-being derived
from cooperation.
11In particular, the following conclusions are obtained:
Firstly, the set of possible sustainable agreements derived from bargaining
is greater when the discount factor of the spouse who decides second is higher.
Secondly, the contribution of the follower to the family good increases
with respect to the discount factor. That is to say, a greater valuation of the
present implies an increase in the proportion of time that this agent devotes
to the family good.
Thirdly, the gains of well-being derived from the bargaining show an am-
biguous relationship to the discount factor. The e⁄ect of the discount factor
will be positive or negative for both spouses, depending on the increase in the
time devoted to the family good in the bargaining situation when the spouse
acts as leader.
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